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 Procreation: Power, and Personal Autonomy: Feminist Reflections 
 
Chapter 4 
 Recasting Reproductive Freedom: Individual, Group, and Global Perspectives 
 
Since Adam downward the rights of humanity have been confined to the male 
line.1   
Mary Wollstonecraft The Vindication of the Rights of Women  
 
After a brief historical retrospective, I will focus on contemporary controversies that bear on 
reproductive freedom, particularly insofar as they turn on contested understandings of the nature and 
significance of reproductive rights and intertwined concepts including autonomy, equality, and personal 
choice. My intent is to attend to the theoretical background that shaped current ways of thinking and 
speaking about reproductive freedom, particularly the unfinished voluntary agenda that links freedom (or 
liberty) with equality. 
Though autonomy, agency, and choice are values endorsed by all feminists, these concepts are 
given radically variant readings both within feminist circles and outside them. I will critically examine the 
conception of reproductive freedom embedded in the marriage between libertarian ideology and the 
fertility industry and then confront problems that lie in the path of a more adequate account of 
reproductive freedom, an account that recognizes both the centrality of gender within prevailing social 
structures and preconditions for equitable social arrangements that free women for full social 
participation. I begin with a much celebrated British case which raises a host of legal and ethical issues 
about reproductive rights and personal autonomy. Then I consider several themes evoked by the case: in 
the quest for equality between men and women, how should we incorporate biological differences and 
heterogeneous social roles? Should there be a free-standing right to nondiscrimination?  
Natalie Evans and her male partner, Howard Johnston, started in vitro fertilization treatment in 
2000 after they had been trying to conceive without assistance for some time.2  During the treatment she 
was diagnosed with a precancerous condition of her ovaries and offered one cycle of IVF followed by 
surgical removal of the ovaries. Her ova were retrieved, six were fertilized with her partner’s sperm and 
frozen. Evans was told to wait at least two years before her health was restored sufficiently to allow safe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mary Wollstonecraft: Vindication of the Rights of Woman, New York, Penguin, 1978 (first printed 
1792), 185. 
2	   This account is drawn from the judgment in the Case of Evans v. The United Kingdom. 6339/05 Eur. 
Ct. H.R.  Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk 
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implantation of the embryos. She inquired about freezing her unfertilized eggs.  She was told that the 
procedure had a much lower chance of success than embryo freezing and was not performed at that clinic. 
Her partner reassured her that they were not going to split up and he wanted to be father to the child. Both 
then signed the required consent forms. The couple separated six months later. Johnston sent a letter to 
the clinic where the embryos were stored withdrawing his consent and requesting their destruction. He 
wanted to get on with his new life and didn’t want to be a father. Since UK’s 1990 Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act requires consent of both parties at each stage of the external fertilization process and 
again before the embryos can be transferred, his withdrawal blocked Evans from using the embryos.  
When the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) which implements the Act ruled 
against her, she appealed to the House of Lords. After another negative ruling she took her case to the 
European Court of Human Rights. She argued that the British ruling violated her human rights.3 
Bloggers had a field day over the Evans case. Right to life advocates stressed the embryo’s “right 
to be born.” They claimed that it was morally preferable that Evans be allowed to use the embryos rather 
than “abandoning” them along with the thousands of unclaimed embryos in storage facilities. Others 
contended that Evans’s partner had every right to withdraw consent, that such withdrawal is the male 
counterpart of a woman’s right to abortion. Still, others searched for technological resolutions of the 
underlying moral problem. Advances in egg freezing techniques would allow women to safely bank their 
ova, thereby circumventing the need to rely on a male partner’s continuing consent. Scholarly 
commentators wondered about comparative harms and implications of the view that embryos are a kind 
of property. Another pointed out the “profound difference” between the situation of Evans and her former 
partner. He could still have his own genetically related children but without access to these embryos she 
could not.4 Eventually the European Court of Human Rights ruled against her too. Several judges 
expressed sympathy for her plight but few defended her reproductive rights over her former partner’s 
control of their joint biological material.  
The issues that surfaced in the Evans case have been adjudicated in conflicting ways by courts 
under the jurisdiction of the European Court and others, including Canada and the U.S.  France 
stipulates that consent for embryo transfer is revoked when a relationship ends. Austria and Estonia allow 
the female partner greater autonomy. The man’s consent may be revoked only up to fertilization. In 
Hungary the woman may proceed despite divorce or death of her partner and in Spain the man may 
withdraw consent only while still living with the woman who provided the ovum. Comparable issues 
have also surfaced in the U.S. and Canada.5 Several commentators have drawn analogies to U.S. case law 
where different jurisdictions have often issued incompatible rulings on the custody of embryos. Pimentel 
argues for a U.S. law that would parallel the British regulations.6 Feminist commentators on the U.S. case 
of Davis v. Davis V. King (often cited in relation to Evans) reach an antithetical conclusion. They tend to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Her brief cited Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 14 (freedom from discrimination) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
4 M. Somerville: “Whose embryo is it anyway?” available at http://www.christianity.ca   
5 Somerville also includes a more extended discussion of Canadian regulations. 
6 G. J. Pimentel: Evans v. United Kingdom, to Procreate or Not to Procreate: Which Right is Greater? Available at 
works.bepress.com.   
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concur with Christine Overall’s assessment that “decision-making about cryopreserved embryos should, 
in cases of disagreement, be assigned to the woman who is entitled to choose whether or not they will be 
implanted in her uterus.”7 Virtually any jurisdiction that is called upon to resolve disputes about the 
disposition of embryos is bound to confront similar morally and legally troubling issues whether they 
have mandatory regulation (as in the UK) or a market-based system (as in the U.S.).8   
Lurking beneath the surface of the immediate issues addressed during the controversy are even 
more pervasive questions that transcend such broken relationships, questions about asymmetries between 
the situation of the parties and the bearing of these asymmetries on the reproductive freedom of each of 
the partners. None of the courts that heard the Evans case dealt forthrightly with power relations tied to 
popular gender stereotypes. 
I turn now to controversy about underlying issues including the reproductive rights of interested 
parties, asymmetries between the parties, the bearing of consent on reproductive autonomy, and links 
between autonomy, genetic connection, and personal agency. 
 
Gender Equality: A Problematic Concept 
The case brings to the surface several inequalities between the circumstances of Evans and 
Johnson. Her illness ended her capacity to become a biological parent. His parental capacity was still 
intact. He might still father a biological child with another partner. She could not. So in the end his rights 
were determinative. His assertion of his right extinguished hers. Wholly ignored during the proceedings, 
however, were sex based biological differences. She had to undergo a surgical procedure to extract her 
gametes. He needed only to masturbate into a cup. Because of such inequalities, particularly those based 
on biological difference, her preferences should, arguably, have greater weight than his. Unfortunately, 
throughout Western history male prerogatives have predominated. I turn now to recapitulate historical 
attempts to right this imbalance. 
The second wave of the feminist movement exposed to intense scrutiny the quest for gender 
equality that marked the first wave. The mistake of Mary Wollstonecraft and her heirs, many claim, was 
to associate equal rights with kind of decontextualized individualism that is oblivious to the actual 
conditions of women's lives. Critical barbs have pointed not so much to the activist strategies that 
Wollstonecraft's descendants champion that are the appropriate objects of feminist critiques of 
rights-based language, such as abortion rights, but to misleading theoretical expositions of rights. 
Particularly objectionable are abstract individualist formulations of rights that tie the quest for liberty and 
equality to a vision of a moral world divided into discrete individual domains. Feminists have criticized 
this conception of moral rights and obligations on several grounds, including its unquestioned acceptance 
of prevailing structures of power and authority and its failure to acknowledge relational matrices which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “Frozen Embryos and ‘Father’s Rights’: Parenthood and Decision-Making in the Cryopreservation of Embryos” in 
Reproduction, Ethics, and the Law: Feminist Perspectives and Joan C. Callahan, ed. 1995, Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 178-198.  
8 R. Thornton. European Court of Human Rights: Consent to IVF Treatment. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 2008; 6: 317-330. 
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resist division into individual territories. Moral theories which give centrality to individual rights, they 
point out, tell us nothing about what should be done when no one has a right to claim that it be done. 
They foster a false perception that only what can be claimed by individuals as their personal due is a 
matter of legitimate moral concern. 
The agendas of the social movements that culminated in the revolutions of the late eighteenth 
century provided the context for the family of concepts that have been pivotal to both feminist and 
non-feminist discourses about reproductive freedom ever since. The ways in which political debate 
reframed concepts like equality, choice, and individual autonomy shifted the locus of discourse from the 
rights of monarchs and feudal lords to the claims of individual citizens and subjects.   
Observing the French revolutionary fervor from across the channel, Mary Wollstonecraft was 
astonished and indignant that the rights and liberties the revolution proclaimed to be the birthright of all 
reasoning creatures were still being withheld from women. She urged "to allow women to share the 
advantages of education and government with men, (to) see whether they will become better, as they 
grow wiser and become free."9 Yet despite the reasonableness of her goal, two centuries later women's 
demands for full and equal participation in public life are still contested. 
Mary O'Brien faults the program of the revolution itself.  She writes:  
To lump liberty, equality and fraternity together is to make a categorical error.  
Fraternity is the ideologically formulated condition of an actual liberty, the brotherhood 
of fathers who are forced to be free.  It is universal only in male terms, and absolutely 
precludes a truly universal freedom and equality, for its condition is the suppression of 
women (1981, 158). 
O'Brien's reading of the revolutionary slogan reflects a hindsight indiscernible to Wollstonecraft, 
herself.10 For she had no position from which to view social conditions beyond the pervasively gendered 
character of her own social reality. Only retrospective interpretation can reveal why, after successive 
waves of feminist protest, barriers to achieving just and equal social arrangements still adhere so 
tenaciously. For though Western democratic legal systems have been effective instruments for extending 
the liberties of many historically disadvantaged groups, they have not been nearly as effective in 
advancing women's liberties--particularly where their reproductive capacities are involved.   
Though the appeal to ‘fraternity’ in the revolutionary cliché does, Annette Baier points out 
(1994,19), invoke a note of mutual concern absent from the call to liberty or equality, it also reveals the 
illusory nature of the “gender blind” conception of liberty and equality that our liberating forefathers 
bequeathed to us. It is not truly blind to gender at all. The conceptual framework embedded in the 
revolutionary project privileges a masculine ideal of moral agency as the universal norm. It tacitly 
universalizes the perspective of those whose life experiences exclude pregnancy, birth, and primary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid. 286. 
10 It also suppresses other senses in which the word ‘fraternity’ is used in French: the bond of solidarity and support 
that unites human beings and the subjective felt sense of that bond. Though both senses were initially understood as 
applying principally to men, arguably, they shouldn't be so limited. This point opens up an alternative strategy for 
recognizing equality in difference.   
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responsibility for the care of children and other family members.  In an article revisiting the construction 
of the French republic following the revolution, Jane Kramer points out how the concept of parité was 
used to sacralize the state and confer a kind of divine right on the male citizen.11 At the same time that 
women were granted civil rights on rationalist and universalist principles they were excluded from 
political rights and did not even achieve the right to vote until after the Second World War. Meanwhile, 
men were enshrined as the “political representatives” of the French family.12 
Awareness of this kind of gender bias motivated activist feminist reformers during the early 
stages of the second wave. Shulamith Firestone, for instance, seized on technological transformation of 
reproduction as women's best hope (1971). As we have seen, defying traditional conceptions of women's 
nature, she insisted that women's oppression stems directly from biological motherhood which she took to 
be more a barrier to self-fulfillment than a vehicle for it.  Women will not be the equals of men, she 
contended, until they are freed of the burdens of childbearing. Only technological reproduction could 
assure women full liberty and equality.  
As we have seen, too, by the late 1970s enthusiasm for such a program of technological 
transformation had waned.  A new generation of feminist scholars argued that equalizing the biological 
functions of men and women was the wrong way to go about building social equality.  Their arguments 
stressed two interrelated themes.  First, the very term “woman” is not primarily a biological concept but 
a historicized one that acquires meaning through social institutions and practices embedding patriarchal 
interests.  Second, the reigning paradigm of equality is modeled on male agency, a conception of men 
freed from domestic labor by their power to relegate these tasks to others over whom they have control.  
Thus, genuine equality, feminist legal theorists repeatedly emphasized, cannot be achieved merely by 
extending commonly recognized moral principles to women.  Overcoming women's subjection requires 
disrupting prevailing structures of power to reinvent and redefine ways of experiencing reality and create 
new communities within which women can devise innovative practices, habits, and roles.  Cynthia 
Daniels in her analysis of fetal rights politics points to the relevance of such rethinking and 
re-experiencing for the public domain:  
Because public life has historically been defined in masculine terms, gender equality 
entails not simply integrating women into the public world on the same grounds as men 
but transforming public structures to reflect the needs and concerns of women." (1993, 
58). 
Rebecca West makes a related point that extends beyond the public domain.  Given the opportunity, she 
observes, women use their full capacities of mind and body, not because they want to be the equal of men, 
"for that is a point in which it is difficult to feel interest for more than a minute or two unless one has an 
unusually competitive mind," but because such free use of one's powers is in itself good.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Kramer, J. 2000. “Liberty, Equality, Sorority.” New Yorker, 5/29/2000. 
12 Ibid. 86. 
13 Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia, Macmillan London Limited, 1942, 679. 
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Lawmakers who use strategies to equalize the liberties of men and women without disturbing 
prevailing legal arrangements often fail to recognize the point of women's demand.  In matters relating 
to childbearing in particular, this evasion either leads them to overlook biological difference completely, 
as in the case of Evans and Johnson, or enmeshes them in tortuous locutions.  Grudgingly 
acknowledging that women and men are not ‘similarly situated’ biologically, they speak of “pregnant 
people” or “pregnable persons.”14  A common strategy in the law governing the civilian workplace is to 
subsume pregnancy under the category of disability, so pregnant women who need to take time off from 
work to give birth or need temporary modifications in their working conditions must fit into niches 
already carved out for the disabled.  So in her discussion of the Angela Carder case Cynthia Daniels 
remarks that "(w)oman is the name of a disability" (1993, 52).15 Such ad hoc strategies present little 
challenge to social arrangements designed for the convenience of those who need make no 
accommodation for reproductive work.  So pregnancy remains a ground for excluding women from 
equal consideration in the workforce and full control over their own reproductive capacities. Moreover, 
even though child rearing activities are more a function of social custom and acquired talent than a matter 
of inborn aptitude, most child care still falls to women, and their identities and social roles have by 
tradition and acquired talent been intimately bound up with nurturing and caring activities.  As the 
workforce is presently structured, these circumstances disadvantage women too.  Any program for 
overcoming women's legal and social disadvantages should be responsive to such features of women's 
biological and institutionalized circumstances. 
Within the last generation some Western European countries have made notable gains toward 
altering workplace structures and integrating women without requiring them to trade off pregnancy and 
child rearing for workforce participation. In Europe, recognition of the importance of women's social 
roles has led to relaxation of abortion laws, even in such strongly Catholic countries as Spain and Italy. 
Some European governments have helped fund child care and educational facilities for preschool 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Such contortions are aptly illustrated in a case that was discussed during the Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings of Ruth Bader Ginsburg that illustrates succinctly both the devices used to exclude 
pregnant women from employment and the kind of argument that is likely to be made to adapt 
constitutional precedents to the conditions of women's lives. When Catherine Susan Struck, a careerist in 
the Air Force, became pregnant she was allowed only two options, either an abortion or discharge.  
Neither was acceptable to her.  Abortion was contrary to her religious beliefs and discharge would 
separate her from the career to which she was firmly committed.  She offered to limit her absence from 
active duty to the accumulated leave she had already earned and then give up the infant for adoption.  
The Air Force refused her offer and she brought suit citing three constitutional issues: religious liberty, 
personal choice and the denial of equality vis-à-vis a man equally responsible for the conception. (Not 
until after she had prevailed in both the trial court and the court of appeals did the Air Force relent). 
 
15 Elizabeth Wolgast discusses this issue in connection with the Supreme Court ruling on the Hyde amendment in 
The Grammar of Justice (1987, ch.2); and Wendy Brown gives it a different twist in "Reproductive Freedom and the 
Right to Privacy: A Paradox for Feminists" (Diamond 1983).  It is a frequent topic in Catherine MacKinnon's work 
where it is given distinctively different emphasis.  
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children, mandatory parental leave policies, and comprehensive health care schemes that free individual 
parents from the burdens of funding their children's health care from their own personal resources. 
In the U.S., though, the ideology that separates public life from domestic responsibilities persists 
tenaciously. Until the Family Leave Act was passed in 1993, there was virtually no public recognition that 
work in the domestic sphere contributes to societal well-being. And that measure provided only token 
relief in emergency situations: a twelve week unpaid leave restricted to those employed by larger 
companies which only the privileged can afford without considerable personal sacrifice.16 Persisting 
discourses misconstrue the struggle for equal rights. One was manifest already in the 1920s feminist 
debates about the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Another has cropped up within a rights discourse 
tethered to abortion politics. I will take up the latter first. 
Kristin Luker (1984) shows that U.S. abortion controversy is not primarily about the moral status 
of embryos but about women’s control over their reproductive capacities and values tied to their 
traditional domestic role.  The force of her argument is nowhere more evident than in the subsequent 
proliferation of “fetal rights” rhetoric which, not only reflects polarization, but intensifies it by 
subordinating the interests of pregnant women to the well-being of their fetuses so that women unwilling 
or unable to terminate their pregnancies within the parameters allowed for abortion may be held legally 
responsible for insuring a healthy outcome. Anti-abortion rhetoric is often crafted to serve rhetorical ends 
by juxtaposing infertile women against women who abort.  This rhetoric portrays the infertile as trying 
to create new life and women who abort as destroying it. This reduction of complex circumstances and 
motives to just two diametrically opposed options plays on a common misunderstanding of the 
reproductive rights movement and shows the need to emphasize the unique personal relationship between 
a pregnant woman and her fetus. I will return to this point later. 
Increasingly, the legal system is being used to press fetal interests independently of pregnant 
women’s interests and sometimes in opposition to them.17 Ironically, even the Roe v. Wade decision 
legalizing abortion has been turned against pregnant women who depend on care within hospitals that 
serve the indigent. That ruling has also been used to override their refusal to submit to cesarean section.18 
Prior to Roe, legal recognition of the fetus was almost always contingent on subsequent live birth. 
Parental interests were paramount. Increasingly since Roe, the fetus has been regarded as a separate entity 
possessing rights of its own independent of the pregnant woman and often hostile to her preferences and 
interests. Though judicial rulings have sometimes cited the Roe decision, that ruling does not itself 
provide warrant for this practice. The Roe court itself noted that U.S. law had never treated fetuses as 
legal persons in the whole sense.  Yet employers sometimes use such rulings as a pretext for terminating 
employment (especially from high-paying jobs) of those referred to as “potentially pregnable women” by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For readers interested in further detail and exploration of the moral dimensions of the Act, see Kittay 1999. 
17 The Angela Carder case, for instance.  See Daniels 1993, Ch. 2. 
18 See, for instance, Veronika E.B. Kolder, Janet Gallagher, and Michael Parsons "Court Ordered Obstetrical 
Interventions" in The New England Journal of Medicine 316, 19, 1987, 1192-1196. Kolder et al.’s worries are being 
borne out by recent legal trends. 
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alleging their potential exposure to toxins which if they were to become pregnant, could endanger their 
fetuses.19 
One of the most flagrant of these industrial health hazard policies was struck down by the 
Supreme Court, but in so doing it effectively exonerated industries from any collective responsibility for 
reproductive safety and shifted responsibility to individual women (Narayan 1995). Courts have also put 
the onus on pregnant women to insure a healthy birth if they fail to follow medical advice. And many 
pregnant women have been subjected to punitive measures that violate their legal rights. Legal scholars 
have spoken of the "dubious legal grounds" on which court-ordered obstetrical procedures rest; and, in 
fact, appeals courts have frequently overruled lower court rulings restricting the legal rights of pregnant 
women, usually on the ground that the laws used to punish their conduct (e.g. delivering drugs to a minor 
through the umbilical cord) were never intended to be applied to fetuses. These rulings have given some 
comfort to defenders of reproductive rights, but their relief is short-lived whenever state legislators pass 
new legislation tailored explicitly to fetuses. 
The political climate begun in the Reagan/Bush years cultivates a public discourse that advances 
the status of fetuses by diminishing women's status. Such policies deny women resources to promote fetal 
health (e.g. adequate nutrition, prenatal care, drug treatment programs) and impose on them the entire 
burden of responsibility for safeguarding fetal well-being. The dogma of fetal rights is, however, only one 
factor among several that forces women into such no-win situations. The reduction of moral discourse to 
competing rights claims is framed within a discourse that disavows collective responsibility for health and 
well-being and equates all moral claims with individual interests. By elevating the status of the fetus to a 
rights holder this discourse jeopardizes the welfare of both the fetus and the pregnant woman. By 
endowing the fetus with rights appropriate only to actual individuals, the fetus is isolated from 
relationships essential to achieving a self-sustaining life. This discourse ignores both the life conditions of 
women on whom fetal health and well-being depend and the community of caregivers on whom they 
must rely to sustain their well-being.  In a widely publicized case a woman’s physician recommended 
that she remain in bed and abstain from sex until she delivered. But the capacity to follow physician 
advice is bound to depend on the support network available to a particular woman--her relation to her 
partner, and whether she is alone or surrounded by caring others.20 The language of competing rights 
obscures background conditions that abet or hinder women's abilities to provide adequate care for 
themselves and the fetal lives within them. 
Viewing Mary Wollstonecraft's consternation through the lens of the fetal rights controversy, it 
becomes clear that appeal to universal human rights may only marginally touch many injustices 
embedded in social institutions that have evolved historically under conditions of privilege. Fetal rights 
rhetoric presupposes the model of abstract individualism. It is a precondition for viewing the fetus as an 
individual. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Part IV in Callahan (1995) includes several articles that address these issues in addition to Callahan's own 
introduction.  Note particularly the contributions of Gallagher, Bertin, and Narayan. 
20 See R. Tong: Theoretical Medicine and Philosophy (2000) 21(6), 1-7. 
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Women’s Rights: The Lingering Effects of Abstract Individualism 
A dispute that plagued women reformers in the 1920s immediately after the establishment of 
female suffrage still resonates within contemporary controversies, both within feminism and in the 
broader political arena. The National Women's Party pressed for an Equal Rights Amendment to the 
Constitution to forbid discrimination on the basis of gender. But feminists working to transform 
workplace conditions for women saw the gender neutral strategy of ERA supporters as a threat, both to 
incremental achievements regulating the terms of women's employment and the more extensive 
employment gains they aimed to accomplish. Alice Paul, a leader of the National Women's Party, was 
pressed by supporters of protectionist legislation to rephrase the ERA more narrowly so it would not 
jeopardize efforts to secure better working conditions for women.  Florence Kelley justified the 
protectionist strategy this way: 
So long as men cannot be mothers, so long as legislation adequate for them can never be 
adequate for wage-earning women; then the cry Equality, Equality, where Nature has 
treated Inequality, is as stupid and deadly as the cry Peace, Peace, where there is no 
peace.21 
Along with other opponents of the ERA, she argued that stress on abstract equality between the sexes 
would hurt women by ignoring sex-specific differences. But proponents feared that retaining legal 
distinctions based on gender would only reinforce prevailing social inequities. 
Martha Minow points to the dilemma embedded in opposition between the two groups: ignoring 
sexual differences would undermine efforts to mobilize women against them, but emphasizing them 
would confine women to gender stereotypes.22 By framing the issues oppositionally no strategy was left 
that women seeking treatment either as individuals or as members of a group could jointly support to 
secure both protection and equality. Prevailing ideologies about individualism, freedom of contract, and 
gender differences prevented them from redefining the terms of the debate.23 So instead of focusing on a 
workplace model that the law should promote or prohibit, legal controversy was narrowly centered on 
whether differences between men and women were sufficient to justify treating women differently. And 
instead of reformulating the prevailing conception of equality to recognize the claims on society of those 
who are disadvantaged by the natural and social lotteries and the social contribution of those who carry 
out society's caring functions, defenders of freedom of contract and ERA supporters both acquiesced to 
the dominant ideology of abstract individualism. 
The terms of that debate shifted very little in intervening years. In academe few challenged 
schemes that stress formal equality maximizing liberty within a laissez faire environment until John 
Rawls made normative theory respectable again. His 1971 volume: A Theory of Justice had enormous 
influence and set off a host of ripple effects. In 1985 Norman Daniels extended Rawls’s theoretical 
framework to bioethics. Daniels placed constraints on liberty to compensate for bad luck in the natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Cited in Minow 1990, 256 who refers to Kelley's Shall Women be Equal (National League of Women Voters, 
1922), p. 41 quoted in Nancy Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism, 138. 
22 Minow, ibid (257) citing Cott again at 142. 
23  Ibid. 
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and social lotteries and recognized some social responsibility for personal well-being. In subsequent 
years, legislative measures, such as the Family Leave Act, ameliorated the working conditions of some on 
an ostensibly gender-neutral basis. But among most theorists and policy makers, liberty-maximizing 
measures permitting racist, sexist and classist choices persisted as long as they were consistent with 
procedural fairness, a strategy that inevitably widens material gaps between the affluent and the 
impoverished.24  
Virtually all feminists are convinced, however, that theoretical and practical strategies that focus 
on the quest for legal equality alone are inadequate to the task of achieving gender justice or eliminating 
the marginalization of other historically disadvantaged groups. Nonetheless, feminists from different 
political orientations have not come together around the kinds of legal reforms needed to remedy gender 
inequities. Equality-oriented strategies will not affect gender-specific attributes and social roles unless 
they address the distinctive historical and cultural circumstances of differently situated groups. 
Admittedly, the ground is shifting. More opportunities have become available to women in the 
workplace who now make up almost half of the U.S. workforce (2012). But dominant preconceptions 
about gender and individual achievement persist in both the public and private spheres--even within 
schemes that aim to achieve equality of opportunity. To a great extent inequalities arise from varying 
conditions across the life cycle, especially those that intensify dependency and disadvantage women who 
bear the bulk of society's responsibility for the care of children, the sick, and the disabled. Consider, for 
instance, the disadvantage women suffer in divorce proceedings that fail to factor in the unpaid economic 
contribution of their domestic labor.  Or the unique needs of pregnant women who may require 
significant social support. Programs to equalize opportunity may originally be intended to reduce the kind 
of inequalities that libertarian schemes give rise to, particularly their effects on historically disadvantaged 
groups, but the very term ‘equality of opportunity’ exemplifies the ambiguous nature of equality language 
I noted within discussion of the ERA controversy. Any measure of equality that aims for universality is 
bound to incorporate both ideological and practical aims and will inevitably have different effects on 
women and men, rich and poor. For its application requires classifying people into groups, then analyzing 
intergroup variations, and assessing outcomes (Sen 1992, 118). Even when equality is achieved in formal 
procedures and public facilities, inequalities in wealth and income will likely persist. So people's 
well-being and living conditions may remain grossly unequal. Abstract equality, even if it incorporates 
equality of opportunity, is not likely to touch inequalities that bear on people's most immediate needs and 
surely cannot insure people's overall freedom to lead the kinds of lives they find personally meaningful 
and valuable. 
Proposals to ration health care over the life cycle succinctly illustrate difficulties inherent in 
formal opportunity equalizing schemes. Some have proposed a rationing scheme that specifies kinds of 
medical care appropriate for people at differing stages of life and reallocates health care resources among 
generations.25 These strategies depend predominantly on apportioning care over a statistically normal life 
span. Though they appear on the surface to achieve intergenerational equity, they depend on a generalized 
conception of a normal life span which risks perpetuating injustices to groups already underserved by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See	  Mahowald 1994, note p. 72.	  
25 Notably Norman Daniels (1985, 1988) and Daniel Callahan (1987).  
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traditional health care systems, particularly in the U.S. where marginalized groups currently constitute a 
sizable proportion of the 17.1 percent who are uninsured.26 
Women, particularly, are likely to suffer under age-based rationing schemes. In the U.S. women 
of reproductive age spend substantially more on health care than men in the same age group and 
maternity care and contraceptives have often not covered by health insurance.27 Also, women tend to live 
seven to eight years longer than men and in the 65 plus age group many more women than men are 
without spouses. Moreover, older women are less likely to have private insurance than men and their 
limited financial resources need to be spread over a longer lifetime, which makes them more dependent 
on publicly funded insurance. One out of five elderly women lives in poverty (the highest rate of any 
group in the U.S.).28 Applying the same criteria for a “normal” life cycle to both women and men would 
intensify the plight of these women.29 So under such rationing schemes the disadvantages of the less 
well-off inevitably escalate. They would be denied comparatively more years of life and the quality of 
their remaining years would be severely diminished.  The social respect afforded them would, most 
likely, lessen too. And their misfortune would be further compounded by society's tendency to grant 
greater social respect to elderly men than to elderly women. Any scheme to equalize health care 
opportunities that does not take such facts about women's circumstances into account disproportionally 
impacts women and intensifies their social disadvantage. 
The current enthusiasm for market solutions to the ills of health care systems portends further 
structural changes that are likely to magnify inequalities in the distribution of resources.  Cuts in 
governmental funding push more people into the category of the underinsured. In the U.S. most health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) are now for-profit businesses that reward physicians who save them 
money and increase their revenue. Their cost savings are returned to investors instead of being retained 
within the health care system to care for the least well off. .  Only sweeping reforms could reduce gaps 
between the rich and the poor and enhance opportunity for a minimally decent standard of living. The 
need for a just vision of health care responsive to the disparate impact of reform proposals on women and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 www.gallup.com/poll/152162/anerucabs-uninsured-2011.aspx 
27 The National Women’s Law Center reports that insurance carriers routinely charge women as much as thirty 
percent more for insurance than	  men under a practice known as ‘gender rating.’ See NWLC. “Turning to fairness: 
Insurance discrimination	  against women today and the Affordable Care Act” at:	  
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlc_2012_turningtofairness_report.pdf  
Note also the Kaiser Family Foundation article, “Expanding Medicaid under health reform: A Look at Adults at or 
below 133% of Poverty” at: http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8052-02.pdf 
28 See L. Weiss: “Unmarried women hit hard by poverty” 09/10/2009 at: 
http:www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/census_women.html	  
29 See also Nora K. Bell, “If age becomes a standard for rationing health care,” in Helen B. Holmes and Laura M. 
Purdy (1992), Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), pp. 83-90.  
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other social groups that have been historically underserved by health care systems has never been more 
pressing.30 
 
Feminist Responses to Embedded Inequalities 
Contemporary feminists have mounted multiple responses to the implications of formal equality 
schemes. Several bear directly on issues that impact reproductive technologies. A critique that had a large 
following in the 1980s gives priority to the removal of patriarchal structures that dominate women. 
Catherine MacKinnon stresses legal remedies to qualify universal principles and undermine the gender 
dominance of men (1987, 1989, 2005). This view has been modified by feminists attentive to power 
hierarchies that affect the condition of both women and men. bell hooks asks: "Since men are not equals 
in white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal class structure, which men do women want to be equal to?"31  
Picking up on this point, others recommend amending universal moral principles so that white middle 
class men no longer count as the standard against which equality is assessed.  They urge recognition of 
the interdependence of equality and difference and the need for moral discriminations that take into 
account the systematically different treatment of specific groups.32 Joan Scott trenchantly observes that: 
"equality might well be defined as deliberate indifference to specified differences" (1990, 138).  Michael 
Walzer makes a complementary point: "The root meaning of equality is negative; egalitarianism in its 
origins is an abolitionist politics.  It aims at eliminating not all differences, but a particular set of 
differences, and a different set in different times and places."33 Building on the apparent paradox 
embedded in this vision of equality, Martha Minow coined the term “dilemma of difference “which she 
applies to quandaries like the one that vexed 1920s feminists (1990). Ignoring differences, she points out, 
perpetuates the power of the dominant, but focusing on them risks perpetuating the stigma and 
marginalization of the dominated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For a fuller discussion of problems in applying a formal equality of opportunity principle without taking into 
account its differential impact on diversely situated groups see KM Dixon: "Oppressive limits: Callahan's 
foundation myth," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19,1994, 613-637; N. Jecker: "Age-based rationing and 
women," Journal of the American Medical Association 266,21,1991,3012-3015; N. Jecker, ed., Aging and Ethics: 
Philosophical Problems in Gerontology (Humana Press, Clifton, New Jersey), 1991.  
31 See hooks: "Feminism: A Movement to End Sexist Oppression" in Equality and Feminism, ed. A. Phillips. New 
York, New York University Press, 1987.  hooks hits on a central problem with the white middle-class women's 
movement, E. Kittay points out (1999).  It presumes an egalitarianism (among men) into which women can 
integrate themselves.  I extend the criticism to MacKinnon insofar as she subordinates all other forms of oppression 
to sexual oppression, neglecting relevant features of the life circumstances of systematically oppressed men (who, 
admittedly, might also oppress women). 
32 I draw here on a theme that has been elaborated by a number of feminists.  A novel formulation of it has been 
offered by Diana Meyers (1994) that draws on the philosophical tradition of impartial reason coupled with what she 
calls “empathetic thought.”  The former recognizes sameness; the latter appreciates difference.  What is 
distinctive about her treatment is the depth with which she develops her conception of empathetic thought.  
33 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York, Basic Books), 1983, xii. 
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Eva Kittay calls this the difference critique of equality. In an essay that challenges the Rawlsian 
framework on which Norman Daniels' age-based rationing system depends, she develops an alternative 
dependency critique which maintains that: 
by construing society as an association of equals, conceived as individuals with equal 
powers, equally situated in competition for the benefits of social cooperation, one 
disregards the inevitable dependencies of the human condition, thereby neglecting the 
condition both of dependents and those who care for dependents (1995, 10-11). 
Difference critiques emphasize historically constructed differences. Though they change over 
time, some are more persistent than others. But the dependencies Kittay focuses on marks every 
individual’s life in varying degrees at different times throughout the life cycle. Everyone starts out as one 
who is cared for and many become carers at a later stage. Underlying her proposal is a subtlety that 
qualifies any principled conception of human equality and calls attention to central human inequalities. 
The relation between caregiver and recipient is from one perspective a relation of unequals, but becomes 
recognizable as a relation of reciprocal equality once we acknowledge the universality of human 
dependency needs and grant caregivers appropriate respect and resources. Societies require appropriate 
structural transformations in order to fully recognize the equality of carer and cared for and to reconstruct 
dependency relations in non-exploitive ways. Given the developmental nature and fragility of human life, 
dependency permeates each of our lives. 
Incorporation of these perspectives into healthcare theory would bring into focus the centrality of 
human relationship to happiness and well-being and the grounding of human relations in dependency 
relations. All of the critiques I have noted problematize dominant liberal assumptions about the terms on 
which substantive equality might be achieved. In combination they challenge basic assumptions 
underlying gender-blind, race-blind, and class-blind approaches to equalizing people's opportunities to 
lead meaningful satisfying lives. Each orientation emphasizes different facets of the work that needs to be 
done to remedy inequalities that perpetuate injustices to historically disadvantaged people. MacKinnon's 
dominance critique points to the need to transform power relations that subjugate women; the difference 
critique emphasizes the multiplicity of group-specific oppressions that need to be overcome; and the 
dependency critique challenges liberal tendencies to privatize the relational web of personal lives which 
removes embedded inequalities from public attention.  
Feminist appraisals of the reproductive rights movement reflect all of these critiques of equality. 
However, gender-based disparities are more conspicuous where reproductive issues are paramount. The 
dilemma of difference that has afflicted feminist struggles for equality has its parallel in advocacy for 
reproductive rights. Though biological differences may be somewhat culturally plastic, they cannot be 
ignored despite the tendency of judges deliberating about pregnancy to refer to “pregnant people” or 
“pregnable persons.” Such overreach for gender neutrality inadvertently calls attention to a difference that 
can't be overlooked. However, the opposite tendency to base the case for legal remedies explicitly on 
gender difference tends to entrench stereotypes even further.34 Though the dependency critique's 
emphasis on care aims to elevate the status of those who do maternal work, many feminists eager to 
slough off the association of caregiving with “women’s work” take issue with any strategy that centralizes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 LP: I wonder how much this tendency is due to bad faith interpretations by people unconvinced of the need for 
genuine equality, rather than any real problem with recognizing genuinely morally relevant differences. 
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caring labor. Underlying each of these differences is a tension among both substantive and strategic 
approaches. Some are more individualistically oriented; others emphasize collective features of women's 
condition.35 
 
Challenges to the Language of the Reproductive Rights Movement 
Some target the reproductive rights movement for advancing an individualistic agenda.  Both 
disability scholars such as Kittay, and ecofeminists including Irene Diamond (1994), stress affinities 
between the appeal to individual rights and masculinist ideologies of personal control and domination. 
They chide those who emphasize rights discourse for neglecting relational values tied to care and 
interpersonal connection.  They point out that the ‘right to choose’ is not the appropriate response to 
social conditions that offer impoverished and isolated women no viable alternative to abortion. Needed 
instead is a more inclusive moral framework that moves beyond appeals to individual rights. If pregnant 
women unable to take on the responsibilities of child rearing were offered suitable support during 
pregnancy and opportunity for continued relationship with their child even where they did not retain 
custody fewer women would be likely to opt for abortion. Then some restrictions on abortion access 
might be justifiable. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 I recognize an ambiguity here and the importance of distinguishing between individualistic and 
non-individualistic conceptualizations of equality/difference as well as individual vs. collective aims.  I address 
specific aspects of these issues in a later chapter.	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The group of radical feminists that I discussed in the previous chapter extend the critique of rights 
language and individual choice to access to fertility treatment as well as abortion. One of their principal 
spokeswomen puts it this way: "Does the desire, the need, the wanting of choice have no limits? If a time 
comes when the rights of one group of women place the majority of women in a dangerous position, does 
not the concept and terminology of rights become meaningless?" (Rowland 1987, 79). Other members of 
this group, Janice Raymond (1991) and Renate Klein (1992), disparaged the abortifacient RU486 despite 
the dearth of other options to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. Raymond's 1993 book expressed a more 
generalized ambivalence to surgical abortion. Other members of the group have criticized the choices of 
lesbian women who request artificial insemination. Ostensibly, their major objection to all these practices 
is their spill-over effect, that by intensifying dependence on a patriarchal medical establishment, they 
extend the identification of all women with their reproductive potential. 
Neither rejoinder is responsive to the need for practical strategies to address present social 
conditions. The vision that guides the ecofeminist approach seems directed more to those who already 
have control over the basic conditions of their lives than those living on the margins who never enjoy the 
control that economic security and reliable social support that others take for granted. Rowland's 
complaint begs the question. It presupposes that there is a meaningful sense in which all women 
constitute a homogenous social group; that fertility technologies can be shown to bring greater harm than 
benefit to women collectively; and that the forbearance of individual women who heed their advice and 
avoid medical remedies can significantly reduce those harms.  In a later chapter I focus on these issues, 
but here I mention them only to point out that these objections to rights discourse operate on a different 
level than the reproductive rights movement.  They do not distinguish sufficiently between how women 
would choose to live if they made their own ground rules and how it is necessary to maneuver within a 
prevailing political order that has been constructed around interests and values that only marginally 
consider women's needs.  Strategies that oppose expanded abortion options or tolerate abortion 
restrictions play into the hands of anti-abortion lobbyists.  To tolerate restrictions under prevailing social 
conditions effectively endorses the illusory promises of care and attention that abortion opponents so 
glibly extend to women at the doors of abortion clinics. Virtually any society includes women whose 
projects are incompatible with the demands of pregnancy. Laura Purdy remarks that we would not want a 
society in which women who changed their minds about continuing a given pregnancy did not have the 
opportunity to end it (1996). The idiom of rights calls attention to the indispensability of the abortion 
option for any social scheme that would meaningfully extend full social participation to women. A moral 
framework that emphasizes care and interpersonal connection can also accommodate the rights of 
individuals. 
 
The Libertarian Defense of Reproductive Freedom 
The terms of much feminist criticism of reproductive rights discourse has been framed in reaction 
to the work of John Robertson, and other libertarians. Here I single Robertson out because he claims to 
accommodate feminist concerns and has thus been the target of much feminist criticism for actually 
failing to do so. I, too, contend that, like many other libertarians, his work aptly illustrates how treating 
people solely as individuals obscures the experience of oppression. Julian Savulescu represents the most 
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extreme version of the utilitarian view that one ought always to choose the alternative that maximizes 
good consequences.36 
Within a political climate where mainstream legal scholars are frequently indifferent to feminist 
scholarship, legal scholar John Robertson's effort to take feminist analysis seriously in his formulation of 
reproductive rights is, in some respects, commendable. In his book Children of Choice: Freedom and the 
New Reproductive Technologies (1994) as well as numerous essays Robertson cites feminist scholars 
frequently, particularly where they share his distrust of state power.37 He picks up some themes that have 
featured prominently in feminist writing, but seldom appreciates their full weight and fails to notice 
others.  
Robertson bases his case for reproductive rights on the desire for offspring which, he claims, is 
"central to individual identity and meaning in life" (1994, 24). He argues that this right should be 
interpreted far more extensively than U.S. law is presently acknowledges, and that "the principles that 
underlie a constitutional right to reproduce would seem to apply to the infertile as well" (38).  
Laboratory conception, he insists, promotes choice. Recognizing the couple's right to use a surrogate is 
necessary, he insists, "to avoid discrimination against infertile wives (40).” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Note the Wikipedia article on him, and his much cited 2001 Bioethics article, “Procreative Beneficence: Why 
We Should Select the Best Children,” Vol. 15, no. 5-6: 413-426. 
37 It is important to bear in mind Robertson’s influential position on the ethics advisory panel of the principal 
society that defends the interests of the fertility industry.  Otherwise, his references to the work of feminists may 
mislead readers who are unaware of his broader agenda or fail to recognize his skewed reading of feminist literature.   
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Against those who argue that those who lack physical ability have no legal claim on assistance to 
reproduce, he appeals to the First Amendment right to read books and its import for the blind.  That right 
prevails regardless of the means by which the information is acquired (39).  It cannot be overridden 
without "a clear showing of substantial harm to the tangible interests of others" (35).  He acknowledges 
the difficulty of demonstrating that a harm is sufficiently compelling to override a presumption favoring 
individual rights.  To those who point out that the culture of the reproductive clinic has a distorting 
effect on judgment, he recommends more comprehensive information by clinical services providers.  To 
those who stress that contracts to bear a child may lead to unanticipated harms, he stresses the 
deprivations people suffer if they cannot enter into such contracts.  He extends priority to the preferences 
of individual consumers to a host of techniques that provide what he terms “quality control.”  These 
include genetic screening technologies, selective abortion, the selection of gamete or embryo donors, and 
fetal therapies.  All of these interventions are brought together under the umbrella of core interests that 
make reproduction meaningful (33-34). 
He insists that this right does not extend so far as to demand services of others but is limited to 
the freedom to seek out the willing assistance of medical practitioners and third party reproductive 
collaborators.  But his willingness to invoke the apparatus of the state to enforce reproductive contracts 
undermines that claim.  Indeed, some commentators wonder if his passion for reproductive choice 
admits of any bounds at all, for more recently, he has provisionally extended the scope of this right to 
human cloning, as well.38   
Yet when the autonomous preferences of a pregnant woman are incompatible with a third party’s 
judgment of the rights of her fetus, he is willing to deny the woman’s liberty.  Significantly, his 
characterization of maternal duties during pregnancy, including state coercion of pregnant women, reveals 
a conservative bent not easily reconcilable with the voluntarism of his stance on innovative technological 
therapies.  This is evident particularly in his reading of the constitutional grounds for his reading of 
procreative liberty.  Though he recognizes that the same values and interests that undergird coital 
reproduction extend to the unmarried, he believes that states may be justified in limiting access to 
infertility therapies on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation, or disability unless 
anti-discrimination laws explicitly prohibit such differential treatment (38).  He acknowledges, though, 
that his reconstruction of reproductive rights is speculative insofar as the scope of procreative liberty has 
never been fully established in law. 
Robertson's apologetic for the fertility industry has evoked extensive criticism from many 
quarters, not only feminist bioethicists but also among legal scholars, theological conservatives, and 
communitarians Here I  discuss only themes that illustrate the need for a more nuanced conception of 
reproductive freedom, leaving other issues to theologians and legal scholars who challenge his 
interpretation of constitutional law.39 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38   In response to the U.S. Presidential Ethics Commission's recommendation that congressional legislation be 
introduced to ban the cloning of human beings, Robertson declared that "(i)f cloning is considered to be a type of 
reproduction, then a law banning cloning might be considered an infringement of people's reproductive rights." 
Cited in the New York Times article by Gina Kolata: "Commission on cloning: Ready-made controversy,"6/9/97, 
A10. 
39 An entire issue of the Washington and Lee Law Review (52(1) 1995) is devoted to critiques of Robertson's book 
by a representative collection of authors including a feminist philosopher (Laura Purdy), a theologian (Gilbert 
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Robertson's defense of the right to reproduce makes it tantamount to a basic good. But just why 
this principle should be so fundamental is far from obvious.  Purdy notes that there are good reasons for 
taking self-determination to be the more basic principle from which procreative liberty is derived (1995).  
For, self-determination is fundamental to exercise control over one's person, secure resources necessary 
for survival, and pursue a personally meaningful existence. Certain goods are termed ‘basic’ within a 
ranking of moral values largely because every human needs them to sustain a distinctively human life 
regardless of their specific circumstances. To be deprived of a basic good is in itself a harm. Rawls, for 
instance, calls them primary goods and includes both those he deems ‘natural’—health and vigor, 
intelligence and imagination—and such social goods as rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, 
income and wealth.40 The place of a “right to reproduce” within such a schema is debatable. For though 
reproduction is necessary to species survival, many individuals live full, rich, and satisfying lives without 
ever reproducing.  Purdy faults Robertson for encouraging people to care too much about their ability to 
have children and for reinforcing the traditional identification of women with childbearing.41 Sherwin 
problematizes the centrality of reproduction in human life plans.  She calls attention to people who 
approach sexual activity with little apparent thought to its reproductive potential.42 
So the right to reproduce would not seem to be so basic a good after all, at most a derivative good 
which many happily forego. 
Other liberal societies also tend to isolate married couples' reproductive activities within a private 
realm that's not readily intruded upon. But this right is not often recognized as a ‘claim right’ imposing 
moral demands on others. It seldom even evokes the kind of moral pull that calls forth spontaneous 
voluntary support (as, say, the inability to pay the cost of an organ transplant).  Gross inequities in 
access to infertility treatment are seldom viewed as so morally troubling that they elicit widespread social 
support.43 Of course, whether they should arouse moral concern is a separate matter. There is a grim 
irony, though, in claiming as a right access to a service that only an affluent privileged few have the 
resources to command. 
Robertson's argument also raises troubling questions about the relationship between means and 
ends. His analogy between blindness and infertility implies that means are mere instruments for the 
efficient achievement of the ends sought. His quasi-legal framework makes no provision for differences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Meilander), and a physician (Howard Jones).  Other law journals have concentrated on more technical reviews.  
Note particularly the excellent review by Radhika Rao in the Michigan Law Review (93, 6, 1473-1497, 1995).  See 
also Susan Sherwin in the Hastings Center Report (25, 2, 1995, 34-37) and Helen Bequaert Holmes in the Women's 
Review of Books (20, 2, 12/9/95).  
40 It is noteworthy that Rawls does not specifically include in either category people's dependency needs, a point 
emphasized by Kittay (1995). 
41 Purdy, op.cit. 
42 op.cit. 1995. 
43 In fact, in Britain which tightly regulates fertility services and offers free treatment, waiting lists in some 
geographical areas are so long that many women are likely to out-wait their reproductive potential before reaching 
the head of the queue.  This is known locally as the “postcode lottery.” 
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between sexual and medicalized reproduction. Once a more efficient way to accomplish the end becomes 
available other methods can be abandoned without loss of value.44  But the use of different techniques to 
satisfy the desire for children have different moral weight and bearing. The intervention of medical 
practitioners with values and purposes of their own transforms their meanings. Donor insemination and 
contract pregnancy each involve distinctive kinds of relationships--among adult parties and the children 
they bear too. Unlike sperm donation, a contract to bear a child, exposes the gestational mother to 
significant bodily and psychological risk. Contracting parties, their attorneys, and physicians cannot so 
readily dodge their share of responsibility for these effects. The anonymity prevalent in sperm donation is 
seldom available to the woman who agrees to bear a child for another. The two types of relationship 
influence the contracting couple's relationship in different ways, they have dissimilar impact on the child's 
sense of identity, and involve distinctive social policy issues. 
The intermingling of a conceptual framework derived from traditional ways of understanding 
gestational, genetic, and rearing arrangements with a language better suited to marketplace transactions 
changes the definition of family.45 Legal policy that keeps the state out of people's bedrooms is not 
automatically extendable to the reproductive marketplace. For non-sexual reproduction enmeshes 
individuals in a complex web of institutional structures endowed with the power and authority to advance 
goals that may be antithetical to the aims of individual procreators. 
Moreover, Robertson's uncritical claim that procreative liberty has roots in personal identity takes 
little account of the background conditions that make it possible. The voluntarism underlying his view 
ignores the ways culturally conditioned gender norms and powerful institutional authorities shape and 
interpret people's choices. More attention needs to be given to multiple levels of decision-making.  
Standard accounts of patient autonomy obscure the degree to which choices are limited at prior 
decision-making levels. By the time individuals make decisions in the medical consulting room their 
options are likely to have been narrowed significantly (Sherwin 1996). Too, Robertson’s unrelenting faith 
in the powers of the medical establishment may run counter to the well-being of women patients. Many 
feminists are wary of those who offer more choices--particularly technologically intense ones--as 
solutions to problems technologies impose. For it is the technology that opens infertility to medical 
choice. Laura Purdy notes that Robertson's "rhetoric of choice would be more convincing if the medical 
establishment had a better record on women's welfare" (1996).  
It is by no means clear what kind of work the discourse of choice accomplishes within 
Robertson's framework. Choice discourse may disguise the powerful influence of paternalistic authorities 
over the options of individuals. If, say, a woman's physician tells her that a specific technological 
intervention is “for the good of her baby” and implies that she would be irresponsible not to use it, she is 
unlikely to do otherwise. When women realize that if they disregard physician advice and give birth to a 
disabled child they are liable to be condemned as criminally negligent, their only options will be to follow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 I discuss this issue in the context of Firestone's view of reproduction. Note also Grimshaw's view, 1986, chapter 
7.  
45 Robertson’s view here is reminiscent of the ownership model of family relations criticized by John Locke in his 
attack on Robert Filmer's divine right patriarchalism--though Robertson extends such powers to the medical fathers 
too.   
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medical advice or avoid physicians.46   Personal choice does not determine their action. Power relations 
do. How events play out will depend on one's positioning within hierarchies of social class and authority. 
Scope for choice-making is likely to expand as one ascends the class hierarchy, but the appearance of 
choice, even for middle class women, may disguise coercive social structures that manipulate them to 
taking responsibility for situations not of their own making. 
Robertson's unbounded characterization of consumer choice leaves readers wondering why he is 
so reluctant to support mandatory regulation of the fertility industry; for, arguably, such regulation would 
enhance people's powers to make informed choices and insure that the services provided to them meet 
minimally acceptable quality standards. Some regulation would seem warranted even if choice has no 
intrinsic importance in his argument but is only instrumentally important to his conclusion.47 
Undoubtedly, the option to exercise choice is a necessary component of moral agency. But if choices are 
to have fundamental a value within a conception of a good life, attention needs to be directed to 
appropriate means as well as the ends sought. 
In response to such criticism Robertson contends that reproductive rights do not entail a positive 
right to assistance but only a negative right to search for qualified collaborators. But he has difficulty 
sustaining this distinction between positive and negative rights. He endorses use of state power to enforce 
preconception agreements and to guarantee the purchase of sperm, eggs, and gestational services.  
Though he associates state enforcement of preconception contracts with negative rights, he fails to 
explain why government must provide the judicial resources needed to exercise the right to procreate but 
is under no obligation to contribute financial resources to exercise that right.48 Rao (1995) draws 
connections between this incompatibility in Robertson's account and his failure to recognize how 
constitutional rights tend to butt into one another.  Similarly, state protection of the rights of one party to 
a procreative contract risks violating the parental rights of other parties and the rights of future children 
who are not parties to that contract.  Disturbing in this connection is Robertson's extension of property 
language to human gametes and embryos--and by implication to the children that are born from 
them--especially in light of his apparent reservations about for-profit fertility clinics.49 
Overall, in her critique of Robertson's view, points to asymmetries that he fails to recognize 
between the right to reproduce and the right not to reproduce. Hence, we will be stuck in a position where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 This situation is reminiscent of the case of Pamela Stewart.  See Daniels’s insightful account of this case (1995). 
47 The appeal to choice seems to serve at least two functions: the ideological one I've referred to and a social one 
insofar as it facilitates repudiation of responsibility for those who lack the material resources to seek out fertility 
services.  In All Our Kin (1974) Carol Stack points out how the dominant social group often uses this ideological 
maneuver to disown responsibility for the misfortunes of welfare mothers. 
48 More recently, Robertson has acknowledged this point and admits now that his argument entails a positive right 
to services.  In his response to critics, he states: "They argue that it is inconsistent to give procreative liberty high 
status and then fail to fund it.  As a moral matter, I am now convinced that they are right." Washington and Lee 
Law Review 233,52,1995, 247, note 46.  Of course, the other way out, preferred by some critics is to reduce the 
scope and status of procreative liberty--at least insofar as it applies to the right to reproduce (in contrast to the right 
not to reproduce).  I have more to say on this point below and take it up again in a subsequent chapter. 
49 Robertson, ibid. note 7, 237. 
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access to infertility services is no more than a privilege available to those who meet requisite social 
criteria--such as being heterosexual and married (1993). She invokes a distinction between a weak and 
strong version of the right to procreate and supports a limited application of the positive right to 
circumvent unjustified discrimination in access to services. Recognizing, as well, that not all interventions 
in the reproductive process are morally equivalent, she establishes a ranking. A woman's right to 
reproduce may conflict with another woman's right not to reproduce, say, where one woman wants to rear 
a child and arranges transfer of her fertilized ova to a another women to gestate who later opts for 
abortion. The right not to reproduce, Overall argues, is more firmly established and would trump the 
positive right.50 
Though Overall's device for dealing with conflicting rights is ingenious, I wonder whether it 
extends far enough to dislodge the individualistic bias of Robertson’s account. Partiality to individual 
interests obscures troubling moral issues, such as assignment of responsibility for preventive measures 
and recognition of societal interests in preserving continuity between procreating and parenting. 
Robertson’s shift from negative to positive rights illustrates weaknesses embedded in that distinction and 
problematizes a moral framework that assigns so much moral work to rights. For a claim to a negative 
right alone would be of little interest without access to the resources that enable exercise of the right. The 
right to noninterference is vacuous without authoritative enforcement (consider difficulties women 
experience in securing access to abortion facilities, enforcement of prohibitions against rape, and other 
forms of physical abuse). Securing the right to self-determination also requires considerable social 
cooperation. Like all claims to equality, its exercise requires mutual recognition of interdependence 
between self and others and granting to others the same respect one claims for oneself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 A similar situation arose in the Stern-Whitehead case though Whitehead was the biological as well as the 
gestational mother.  She initially signed a contract stipulating that if the biological father asked her to abort she 
could not refuse.  Subsequently, the judge voided this provision stating that she could not be asked to waive her 
constitutional rights (In the matter of Baby M., 217 N.J.Supr.313, 1987, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 109 
N.J. 396, 1988).  This approach also resembles the line of reasoning employed by the judge in the Davis v. Davis 
case which concerned the custody of a divorced couple's frozen embryos.  Priority was given to Mr. Davis' 
preference to have the embryos destroyed over Mrs. Davis' wish to implant them (Tenn. Cir. Ct, 1989; reviewed 
Tenn. Ct. App., 1990).  Remarking on this case, Rosemarie Tong does not question the decision per se but, rather, 
the alacrity with which the court acknowledges a man's right not to procreate, given that it took previous courts so 
many years to recognize women's right not to procreate! (1997, 232) 
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An analogy between reproductive rights and “the right to die” might be informative here.  The 
(negative) right of the competent adult to refuse life prolonging treatment even when it would lead to 
almost certain death is far more firmly established in law and morality than the (negative) right to 
reproduce. Yet third party assistance to end that life would introduce a different set of moral and legal 
issues extending far beyond the rights of the individuals affected. The right of refusal flows from the right 
to bodily self-determination, a right to be left alone, and to keep intruders at bay, but the putative 
reproductive right pertains to a ‘right’ to seek out collaborators to end that life. Claims for assistance 
implicate others in causing death and raise moral questions about the responsibility of those (such as 
physicians) who hold a position of public trust.  Overall's device for prioritizing rights does not stretch 
far enough to address this conflict. For the problem is not that pursuit of the right to die bumps into other 
rights, but that involvement of particular others bumps into competing moral and social values. So 
Overall's response to Robertson introduces a useful distinction but does not affect the individualistic bias 
of his account, particularly his unqualified claim that laboratory conception promotes choice. Neither 
does this rejoinder challenge Robertson's stress on medically intensive interventions and his disregard of 
alternatives such as preventive measures and adoption. The individualistic bent also diminishes the moral 
and social significance of relational links between generations and between donors whose bodily parts are 
appropriated and recipients who appropriate them as commodities. 
Another key difficulty with Robertson's individualistic framework is its near obsessive 
preoccupation with state power which he sees as invariably repressive. Feminist analysis has emphasized 
the multiple sources of power and its operation across economic, political, and ideological arrangements. 
Feminists recognize that state power has been deployed both in opposition to and in support of women's 
interests. Robertson acknowledges in passing that social policy needs to protect women from new forms 
of private sector coercion (231), but he fails to recognize how power is embedded in the organization of 
social relations, particularly relations between the “infertile couple” and her medical practitioner. Nor 
does he give due weight to the power of insurance carriers who often deny coverage to people who 
undergo genetic screening tests (even without regard to the outcome) or those who live in communities 
with a high incidence of genetic disease.51 Legislatures in several countries are currently working on 
proposals to protect the insured from such arbitrary discrimination by insurance companies.52 The aims 
and ends of individuals who use these technologies may be threatened more centrally by private insurance 
carriers and other institutional interests than by state power. Alliances between regulatory and medical 
authorities shape fertility problems in distinctive ways that obscure the search for alternative solutions. 
Robertson is so wary of state power that he ignores the positive contribution the state's regulatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For detailed discussion of this phenomenon see Henry T. Greely "Health insurance, employment discrimination, 
and the genetic revolution" in Kelves and Hood (1992) and the New York Times Magazine for 9/15/95. Despite the 
federal 2007 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, protection from discrimination is still incomplete. See 
David Schultz, “It’s legal for some insurers to discriminate based on genes,” NPR, Jan. 17, 2013, at 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/01/17/169634045/some-types-of-insurance-can-discriminate-based-on-genes. 
52 This issue has particularly urgency in the U.S., the only developed country that does not provide some form of 
universal health care coverage.  
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capacity can make through its regulatory capacity to minimize the negative externalities of the 
marketplace. His justification of a laissez faire policy leaves physician prerogatives untouched.53  
The mesmerizing influence of libertarian ideology obscures the multiple sources of power and the 
threat to reproductive freedom from non-state powers. Overt sources of power are readily identifiable but 
covert ones are frequently obscured, often by processes of internalization. Sandra Bartky (1990) explores 
the processes of internalization through which noncoercive measures such as disciplinary techniques and 
controlling functions can be deployed to normalize practices that advance the interests of selected groups 
and shape options to further the aims of those able to master such powerful forces.  Her own examples 
are derived from the cosmetic industry and the pornography trade, but her analysis is readily extendable 
to the fertility industry.  To show why people comply so readily with normalizing practices that don't 
support their primary long-term interests, Bartky distinguishes two senses of internalization.  Something 
is internalized when: (1) it is incorporated into the structure of the self, one's mode of perception and 
self-perception which allows the self to distinguish itself from other selves and from things that are not 
selves and 2) the sense of oneself as a distinctive and valuable individual is tied to how one is perceived 
and what one knows, especially what one knows how to do--what gives one a sense of mastery, 
competence, and a secure sense of identity (77). Like neuroses that have secondary benefits but don't 
advance people's chief goals, compliance with such norms brings advantages. Consequently, these people 
are likely to resist letting go of this self-perception and sense of competence. Having a feminine body 
may be essential to a woman's sense of herself as a desiring and desirable subject. And caring for babies 
may be the only kind of activity she is confident of doing well. So normalizing techniques are likely to be 
far more effective than the overt exercise of power in producing new norms of motherhood that intensify 
the identification of women with mothering and control available options. Those who have mastered such 
disciplinary techniques can control the availability of options and offer only certain kinds of solutions 
(medical ones) to the problems of infertility thereby eclipsing other ways of defining fertility problems.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Incidentally, it is akin to the appeal to “privacy” used by the American Medical Association in its amicus brief in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (492 U. S. 490, 1989).  To protect the turf of the medical establishment 
the AMA argued that government intrusion on abortion decisions was objectionable because of its potentially 
disruptive effect on the private relationship between physician and patient.  Feminist legal scholars note that 
reducing the abortion rights to a privacy right (acquired by walking into a doctor's office) is likely to provide only 
very	  limited protection to women seeking abortion.  For unlike basic rights that inhere in individuals as such, 
privacy rights belong to a person only derivatively. For an interesting treatment of this issue that includes a 
discussion of the basis for this right see Susan F. Appleton: "Doctors, patients and the constitution: A theoretical 
analysis of the physician's role in `private' reproductive decisions" in Washington University Law Quarterly, 63(2), 
1985, 183-236. Though Robertson does not espouse the view that reproductive rights are derivative, the effect of his 
position is similar to the AMA's insofar as neither takes into account the power of	  physicians to shape and delimit a 
woman's options. 
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Robertson does acknowledge some of the difficulties I have mentioned. But he reinterprets them 
as private matters to be resolved on an individual basis by what he calls “responsible use,” rather than as 
problems that call for collective response. He grudgingly grants the state only a minimal regulatory role 
as a neutral arbiter keeping parties to certain ground rules such as protection against false and misleading 
advertising. The formal individualistic framework of his quasi-legal approach to the institutionalization of 
infertility obscures broader social and psychological dimensions of these issues. 
 
Rethinking Reproductive Rights and Wrongs 
Though an appeal to rights in the wrong theoretical hands can easily get out of control, it may still 
serve useful purposes if is circumscribed within a fitting context. To show this I will focus on two 
interrelated themes that I have alluded to briefly within my critique of Robertson's libertarian view: 
feminist critiques of a rights framework and controversies about the priority of choice.  
In the European Commission Report on reproductive technologies Jonathan Glover complains 
that the appeal to rights 
  seems to give us the framework of an approach to moral problems without much 
substance. Everything depends on what rights we have; and more fundamentally, on what 
procedure we use to determine what rights there are (1989, 27). 
In fact, European bioethicists, generally, give only scant attention to rights talk and often deride American 
obsession with rights language. Notably lacking, though, in many European countries are the informed 
consent protections that Americans take for granted. In Britain physicians have, until very recently, 
enjoyed virtually complete clinical autonomy. Efforts in France to pass living will legislation were 
opposed by the medical profession as an assault on their authority.54 Patient advocates in these countries 
often look to America for strategies that might give patients greater voice in protecting their own 
interests.  But the rights framework that has played such an important role in U.S. bioethics discourse 
has its roots in unique features of American experience linked to specific historical events that flagrantly 
violated individual rights including other rights-based health initiatives, the civil rights movement, and 
struggles for women's rights. 
The revolutionary movements of the late-eighteenth century and the suffrage movement 
demonstrated that rights talk can be useful in combating oppression. Even if rights discourse cannot 
provide a full-blown account of moral relations, it may have concrete uses within limited moral domains. 
Rights language often serves important political purposes outside libertarian theory. It calls attention to 
submerged voices and injustices inflicted on those lacking other access to power. As Patricia Williams 
points out, if the socially excluded cannot appeal to rights they are likely to remain disempowered (1991, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 LP: Somewhat ironically, the recent Lambert case had some family siding with doctors who wanted to end the 
life of a paralyzed individual in a vegetative state; other family members had recourse to the European Court of 
Human Rights which ruled the move impermissible. (The Telegraph, “European Court Tells France to Keep 
Paraplegic on Life-Support,” June 25, 2015, at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10924423/European-court-tells-France-to-keep-parapleg
ic-on-life-support.html. More recently, a court sided with the state, however. 
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152-154). A well-focused appeal to rights can be a vital tool for gaining access to those who wield power 
and waging the struggle against injustice. 
Feminist philosophers who train their attention primarily on moral dimensions of particular 
relationships tend to emphasize limitations of rights language.55 Diana Meyers notes that appeals to rights 
are often made when there is a breakdown in loving and caring relationships among people--when their 
interests are neglected. She sees the morality of rights primarily as a morality of self-defense used to 
protect people from assaults on their personal integrity, aggression and severe deprivation (1987, 146). 
Rights, then, provide a kind of safety net to keep people who lose their balance from falling to their 
destruction. They accomplish this by concentrating on human dignity in general.56 So an appeal to rights 
provides only a generalized perspective that captures only one dimension of morality. Even securing 
equal rights for all members of society would not suffice to eliminate all injustices, Meyers maintains 
(1994, 155). For it could not tell us how to respect people individually. An additional perspective is 
needed that focuses on the development of empathy and other particularized moral sensitivities to 
enhance responsiveness to other people's circumstances. 
Such caution in invoking appeals to rights need not, of course, preclude the use of rights language 
altogether. It is worth remembering that the rhetoric of rights predates the ascendancy of libertarian 
theories that totalize rights language. Moral discourse emphasizing the centrality of rights is a descendant 
of older concerns about obligation and justice, virtue and happiness that have been ubiquitous in general 
and popular discussion since antiquity.  But not until the seventeenth century were legal dimensions of 
this discourse applied specifically to the situation of women.  In England, the first printed compilation of 
women's rights appeared in 1632. Called: "The Lawes resolution of women's rights: or, the laws provision 
for woemen (sic). A methodological collection of such statutes and customes, with the cases, opinions, 
arguments, and points of learning in the law, as doe properly concerne women. . . . ," it provides a 
narrative description of laws relating to property, inheritance, dowry, elopement, marriageable ages, 
widowhood, etc.57 In his conclusion, the author expresses the hope that bringing together all the relevant 
materials from obscure volumes will benefit women and enable them to understand their position better. 
When I spotted it in the British Library exhibit case the volume was opened to a page that addresses wife 
beating. 
Particularly noteworthy is the author's limited scope: women need only understand their legal 
position; no mention is made of changing it. In this respect the goals of the French and American 
Revolutions represent an historical advance in women's condition. As Wollstonecraft so emphatically 
observed, these movements fell far short of their ideals, but their stress on the universality of rights laid 
the groundwork for contemporary rights claims. Wollstonecraft's protest against the status quo reminded 
those in power that women were not merely loyal subjects petitioning their favor, but claimants 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Some, including Tronto (1993) and Benhabib (1992), are cautious about any generalized appeal to moral 
principles in order to allow space for dimensions of morality that do not lend themselves to principled treatment.  
56 Minow and Shanley (1996) defend a theory of relational rights that seeks to accommodate the concerns that 
motivate Meyers within a reconstructed liberal framework. 
57 It was published in London in 1632 by the assignees of John More, for John Grove 1632 (British Library 
Document # 228. C12), pp. 128-129. 
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demanding their due under already established principles of justice.  The struggles for voting rights, for 
full participation in the workforce, and equal opportunity for minority populations are all descendants of 
this protest, grounded in a conception of a common humanity based on shared human needs.  
An alternative way to reconnect rights claims to a more inclusive moral matrix is to view them as 
derivative from a theory of obligation.58 This would shift the focus from the agent claimant to the 
recipient who is obligated to honor the claim. This move would also achieve the desirable political effect 
of rights advocacy (obliging others to acknowledge what is due to the less powerful) without precluding 
the appeal to other moral categories, such as the particularized moral sensitivities that Meyers stresses. 
Introducing rights language into such a framework would shift the moral perspective from the powerful to 
the powerless, from those who make policy to those affected by policy made by others, thereby 
addressing situations where those others fall short of their moral obligations to rights claimants.  Such a 
strategy could also be incorporated within a theory of obligation by emphasizing social dimensions of 
rights bearers' interests. Insofar as they have a personal stake in objective social conditions, they stand to 
gain or lose depending on the outcome of social arrangements.59   
 
At The Margins of Individual Choice.  
Like other market-driven views of human relations such as Richard Posner's, libertarians take 
choice to be solely a personal affair having little relevance for social relations beyond a narrow circle of 
intimate relationships.60 Robertson extends the narrowly focused rhetoric of choice, so prominent in 
abortion debates, to infertility interventions with little added nuance. The sources and consequences of 
choices have little import for him. Like the fertility clinic whose motto is "You're not a failure until you 
stop trying,"61 this interpretation of infertility treatment throws the entire responsibility for technological 
success or failure onto the individual patient.  Success is solely a function of individual effort. What 
happens within the woman's body is presumed to lie within her own control if only she allows the experts 
to continue doing the work of nature. Hence the appeal to choice naturalizes some preferences to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 This is the strategy employed by Onora O'Neill (1988, 2002). 
59 Some moral frameworks give substantially greater prominence to this perspective. See, for instance, Joel 
Feinberg's "Harm and self-interest," (Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton U.P., 1980, 45-68). 
Feinberg and others who share his perspective lay great stress on the scope of liberty granted to individuals. Having 
a right is a function of having interests that are constitutive of one's good and can be conferred or withheld. The 
great weakness of this view lies in its disregard of the interests of intermediate groups.  
60 Marilyn Strathern offers some insightful observations about the voluntarism and narrow focus on human affairs 
pervading Glover's (1989) treatment of the technologies (1992, pp. 33, 46, and passim). But his approach is still far 
more conservative and carefully qualified that either Robertson's or Posner's who extends the market-driven strategy 
even further than Robertson. Note, for instance, his defense of baby selling in his Sex and Reason (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992, Ch. 15) and his articles discussing the regulation of adoption such as: "Elisabeth M. 
Landes and Richard Posner, "The economics of the baby shortage," Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1978), 323 and 
Richard Posner, "The regulation of the market in adoptions," BUL Review 67 (1987), 59.   
61 Cited by Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (1995).  
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detriment of others and blocks objections to technological medical interventions reclassified as 
“natural.”62 This label also serves to eliminate the need for any further explanation. 
Feminists have had an ambivalent relationship to the kind of moral minimalism that marks much 
advocacy of abortion rights, that sees liberty as a primary good and individual autonomy as the essence of 
personhood and the principal mark of agency and personal identity.  They have expressed misgivings 
about relegating reproduction to a sphere of “privacy” that isolates reproductive acts from the cluster of 
meanings and values surrounding childbearing that have been central to the lives of individual women 
and to ties among women that transcend generations and communities. Overemphasis on choice lends 
itself to an impoverished sense of personal and social values. Susan Bordo (1994) comments on the 
tendency of this perspective to neglect other moral aims that are not expressible as matters of individual 
preference--relational ties, sexual equality, a nurturing stable child rearing environment. In an insightful 
critique of the liberal tradition, Seyla Benhabib points wittily to the fallacy imbedded in the view that 
"human selves just spring up like mushrooms." The identity of the self, she contends, depends less on 
one's choices than on how an individual shapes and fashions circumstances over which one has no 
choice--birth, family, language, culture, and gender--and weaves them into a coherent narrative that 
represents her own life story (1987,166).  
Others have pointed out how the stance that takes individual liberty to be a primary good may 
play into the hands of anti-choice feminists who characterize abortion as an act of violence.63  The ease 
with which abortion opponents have appropriated feminist rhetoric to defend a program for social change 
that is antithetical to feminist aims illustrates one of the principal weaknesses of any conceptual 
framework that relies on abstract acontextual principles. A truncated conception of choice contributes to a 
distorted perspective from which the abortion option seems arbitrary and rootless, a mere expression of a 
non-rational preference (like the consumer choices of 'economic man'). Historian Rickie Solinger in her 
commentary on the adoption of choice language by liberal feminists following the Roe decision remarks: 
I am convinced that choice is a remarkably unstable, undependable foundation for 
guaranteeing women's control over their own bodies, their reproductive lives, their 
motherhood, and ultimately their status as full citizens (7, 2001). 
Her point applies not only to the usage chosen by liberal feminists to refer to abortion without 
rankling opponents, but also to radical feminists who use choice language to urge women to resist 
medical remedies to infertility. Choice rhetoric detaches reproductive freedom from a comprehensive 
vision of moral rights and personal identity. Transfer of the language of commercial transactions to 
personal decisions about reproduction trivializes determinations that are central to one's major life 
projects. The market model is too vacillating to represent a right so central to women's capacity for 
self-determination. For both heterosexual and lesbian women who want babies and for those women for 
whom this is not the right time for a baby (or for whom no time may be the right time), reproductive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 For fuller elaboration of this point, see Davis (1995). 
63 For more than a decade now this has been a recurrent theme in the writings of some who claim allegiance to 
feminism. Note Wendy Brown's "Reproductive freedom and the right to privacy: A paradox for feminists" (in 
Diamond 1983). She complains that abortion involves "surrendering one's body to technological intrusion" (p. 322).  
Also see Linda McClain's "Equality, oppression, and abortion: Women who oppose abortion rights in the name of 
feminism" (in Weisser and Fleischner 1994).  
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rights may be indispensable to their ability to pursue plans and projects they see as basic to their 
self-identities. 
Not only did the adoption of choice language fail to defuse opposition to abortion, but it also 
failed on several other counts as well. Choice rhetoric also blinded abortion supporters to other 
deficiencies of the choice model. It depends on an abstract conception of individuals as independent 
beings who exercise choice in isolation from surrounding others and presumes that existing social 
institutions are as stable and unchanging as abstract individuals.64 In actual fact, the opposite is often the 
case.  Novel opportunities are constantly making their way into preexisting social frameworks where 
they may actually curtail people's ability to exercise agency, either by closing off some choices or 
imposing psychological constraints on the exercise of others. The first casualties after passage of Roe 
were poor women who lacked the material resources to exercise the abortion option without public 
assistance. New modes of birth control challenged established divisions between contraception and 
abortion further inflamed abortion controversy.65 Similarly, the availability of reproductive 
technologies reconfigures activities surrounding reproduction in ways that affect not only the particular 
women who seek them out, but others as well. And the accessibility of new modes of reproduction 
inevitably influences the way we view ‘normal’ reproduction. The new choices offered by 
post-menopausal pregnancy may impose a kind of ‘coerced voluntariness.’ A woman whose self- esteem 
is linked to being of use to others may not find it easy to decline a request to gestate a child for a son or 
daughter. Such women are likely to see themselves as selfish if they give priority to their own interests 
over the urgent pleas of infertile offspring. In such ways technologies purportedly intended to expand 
choices often end by constricting them. 
Fortunately, subjective consciousness does not have to be any more fixed and immutable than 
objective material and social conditions. Instead of merely acting out of socially constructed expectations, 
increasing numbers of women are asking how such expectations apply to the circumstances of their 
particular lives. Mardy Ireland's (1993) study of childless women belies the view that reproductive 
choices can be fitted into a unitary framework that permits a global assessment of what is good or bad for 
women collectively. Some of her subjects regard maternity as an organizing element of their 
personalities; others have delayed childbearing to focus on other interests first. A third group have 
organized their identity in ways that do not include maternity.  
Though it is possible to speak of the ‘choices’ these women have made, choice does not seem the 
appropriate idiom to capture the unifying theme of their narratives. “Choice” is not an option for many of 
these women. The traditional woman who sees maternity as integral to her identity cannot easily say no to 
it. For the third group the desire that would prompt choice is missing. Only in the case of women who 
defer childbearing for a later juncture in their lives is it meaningful to speak of choice in the 
agent-oriented sense. But even here the processes through which these women rethink their identities over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 On this point and for a far more detailed and comprehensive discussion of these issues see Minow (1990), 
especially chapter 6. 
65 LP: However, the line between contraceptive and abortifacient has been deliberately muddied by those who (1) 
argue (questionably) that the allegedly magic moment of valuable human life begins when the sperm meets the egg, 
and (2) falsely, that morning-after pills—and some hold, even The Pill--prevent implantation. See Laura Purdy, “Is 
emergency contraception murder?” at RBMOnline - Vol. 18 Suppl. 1. 2009 37-42 Reproductive BioMedicine 
Online; www.rbmonline.com/Article/3449 on web 12 December 2008. 
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time and reorient themselves to their social world can hardly be captured in the language of choice.66 
Their decisions feel more like positions affecting their relation to their own identities within the context 
of their lives. Few of them have made deliberate choices in the way those in thrall to the market model 
think of choice---resources to be consumed, freely available to all who can bear the price.  
Reproductive choice, like sexual object choice, is a misnomer. Both are more like orientations to 
the surrounding social world than deliberate consumer choices. Richard Mohr points out that coming to 
have a sexual identity doesn't have the same sort of structure as decision-making.  The “choice” of a 
sexual partner does not express a trivial desire that might be comparably fulfilled by simple substitution 
of the desired object. If, say, people who ate a certain food were threatened with prison terms, shattered 
careers, family alienation and loss of housing, they would, no doubt, substitute something else for it. 
Having a certain sexual orientation is not like making a career choice either, even a very serious one. For 
people don't set out to be homosexual the way they prepare for a musical career or an academic one--or 
even the ways they work to acquire the discipline and habits associated with such choices. Mohr calls it "a 
given material condition of life" that's accompanied by certain capacities and limitations. Hence it is more 
like a discovery than a choice.67 The desire for a child seems to share some affinities with Mohr's 
characterization of sexual object “choice.” This would explain, in part, why women can become 
obsessively preoccupied with the quest for a child and why they can be readily manipulated by those who 
promise to fulfill their desire. Characterization of such desires as choices is as grossly misleading as 
Robertson’s market model of reproductive choice. There is a poor fit between the language of choice 
anchored in a fully conscious level of experience encompassing intentional projects and plans, and the 
usual ways people go about baby making.  Unlike, say, a decision to use short-acting contraceptives, 
becoming pregnant seldom falls straightforwardly within the domain of deliberately reasoned action. 
Other people’s influences and unrecognized unconscious or preconscious elements stemming from 
internalized social norms may be at work here. Emphasis on choice language distorts the relational 




How, then, do these multiple considerations bear on reproductive freedom? What conditions 
would a conception of individual liberty need to satisfy to fully recognize the psychological and social 
structures that shape women's experiences and facilitate liberation from structures and stereotypes that 
perpetuate women's subordination? 
First, liberties would be situated within a context that makes it clear why self-determination 
should be respected, how it is related to surrounding values such as personal autonomy, and how it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 I realize that some existentialist philosophers (Sartre and Camus come to mind) use choice language in a more 
extended sense. But often this is a rhetorical device to jar readers out of complacency. Often too, it is indicative of 
an exaggerated sense of what individuals might accomplish in the social world if only they altered their personal 
attitudes. I am using the language of choice in a sense more closely tied to those feminists I referred to in my 
response to John Robertson's conception of reproductive freedom. 
67  Cited in 13 Questions in Ethics, G. Lee Bowie et al (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) 1991, 127-128.	   	  
	  	   30	  
interconnected with obligations to safeguard collective well- being.  There are additional grounds 
beyond individual liberty, say, for insuring access to abortion services or leaving it to individual women 
to regulate their own conduct during pregnancy as freely as any other adult, and there may be other 
reasons for providing access to fertility services at public expense. Both individual and societal interests 
in maximizing health and safety need to be factored in, as well as public interest in maintaining a balance 
between births and deaths. 
Second, reproductive interests that lock women into traditional gender roles would be clearly 
distinguishable from those that are basic to women's opportunities to participate in a full range of societal 
activities. Reproductive rights should be firmly anchored in the lived experience of women who are most 
centrally affected and should take adequate cognizance of both the materiality of social relations and the 
materiality of women's bodies. 
Third, exclusive preoccupation with either individual or group interests would be exposed as 
untenable. An adequate account of the moral dimensions of procreation would seek a balance rooted in a 
vision of human relationships that encompasses both subjective dimensions of personal experience and 
interconnection among experiencing subjects. It would stress the importance of cultivating empathetic 
knowledge and concern for others as indispensable human traits to overcome the excesses of 
self-absorption and self-abnegation. 
Fourth, an acceptable understanding of reproductive liberty would demonstrate the importance of 
a systematic public policy that emphasizes alternatives to medical solutions for problems that are 
fundamentally social. As a beginning: there would be more adequate methods of prevention to reduce 
occasions requiring either abortion or infertility treatment. Also, there would be safer, and more timely, 
non-intrusive methods of birth control and abortion and less intrusive, less pressured conditions to 
circumvent infertility. For those for whom adoption is not a viable option, such a restructuring would 
include alternative opportunities for intimate relationships with young children.68 
Lastly, a reconstructed conception should restore the centrality of being a parent engaged in 
caring practices that make for a child's flourishing. Unlike accounts that emphasize procreative liberties 
and processes of gestation and undervalue parental responsibilities, an adequate framework would 
recognize that procreation is not an independent detachable activity.  Procreative values would be 
reconnected to a more comprehensive framework that recognizes the full significance of responsibilities 
for rearing children and appreciates how being a parent is bound up with the continuing self-development 
of adults and major life goals. 
In the chapter that follows I consider further ways of speaking collectively of women's situation 
that acknowledge the significance of differences among women. I weigh both the social and personal 
interests at stake. I will consider feminist modifications of the concept of personal autonomy that take 
fuller account of the life circumstances of those whom the prevailing theory relegates to the margins. An 
important dimension of my focus in succeeding chapters will be to resituate procreative rights within a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 On the limitations of the adoption option see Bartholet (1993), Narayan (1994), Mahoney (1995), and Smith 
(1996). For a discussion of problems in current adoption procedures, see Family-Making: Contemporary 
Challenges, (eds.) Francoise Baylis and Carolyn McLeod, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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more inclusive context that fully recognizes subjective dimensions of individuality, the bearing of 
relational ties on personal autonomy, and societal interests.  
